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traded funds of funds and listed private equity funds predict changes in self-reported book 
values of unlisted private equity funds.  
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I. Introduction 
Private equity (PE) refers to equity securities in private companies that are not publicly 
traded. Private equity funds that specialize in PE investments opened up this asset class to 
institutional investors and other capital market participants. The early successes of some 
large PE funds led to a rapid growth of this asset class. Capital commitment to private 
equity in the U.S. has grown rapidly from around $20 billion in 1990 to over $496 billion 
in 2007.
Although PE has experienced rapid growth, the risk and return profile of this asset 
class is not well understood. Many news stories in the media suggest that PE investments 
yield higher returns than traditional asset classes.
1 A recent news release by Thomson 
Financial and the National Venture Capital Association announced that Thomson 
Reuters' US Private Equity Performance Index (PEPI)
2 “across all horizons outperformed 
public market indices, NASDAQ and the S&P 500, through 9/30/2008.” For example, for 
the 20-year period ending in September 2008, PEPI earned annualized return of 15.4% 
after fees, which is more than twice the return of 7.5% earned by S&P 500. 
A number of academic papers also report superior returns for private equity 
investments. Ljungqvist and Richardson (2003) find that private equity investments 
outperformed the S&P 500 by more than 5%. Cochrane (2005), Kaplan and Schoar 
(2005), Peng (2003) and others also find that private equity funds outperform the S&P 
500. However, these papers use databases that suffer from potential selection bias. 
Performance information is usually compiled from self-reported data provided by large 
private equity investors. It is quite likely that investors who do not have good experiences 
with their PE investments exit those investments or choose not to report their 
performance. Hence, PE funds that performed poorly are less likely to be included in 
these databases.
1  See Phalippou and Gottschalg (2009) for examples of several news articles that report high expectations 
for returns from PE investments. For example, the Financial Times (September 26, 2005) reports that a 
survey of large U.K. investors found that these “investors hope to make an average annual net return of 
12.8 percent from their private equity investments.” 
2 See http://www.nvca.org/pdf/Q3_08_VC_Performance_Release.pdf.  The Private Equity Performance 
Index (PEPI) is computed based on “quarterly statistics from Thomson Reuters' Private Equity Performance 
Database analyzing cash flows and returns for more than 1,900 US venture capital and private equity 
partnerships with a capitalization of $828 billion. Sources are financial documents and schedules from 
Limited Partner investors and General Partners.” 2
Moreover, the estimated performance of PE funds depends critically on the 
valuation of non-exited investments at the end of the sample period. For instance, Kaplan 
and Schoar use funds’ self-reported values of such non-exited investments and find that 
the value-weighted performance of PE funds exceeds S&P 500 return by five percent 
over the life of the fund.  This cumulative estimate is equivalent to outperformance of 
about 1% per year according the approximation provided by Phalippou and Gottschalg 
(2009). However, Phalippou and Gottschalg argue that it is more reasonable to write-off 
non-exited investments after a certain period of time and they find that PE funds 
underperform the market by 3% to 6% per year.
3 Even if we set such disagreements 
aside, these estimates of PE performance are not based on market prices.  
This paper examines the risk and return of private equity investments using 
market prices of two samples of publicly traded firms that invest in private equity. The 
first sample is publicly traded funds of funds (FoFs) that invest in private equity funds. 
Funds of funds accounted for 14% of global commitments made to private equity funds 
in 2006 according to Preqin, a research and consultancy firm focusing on alternative asset 
classes. FoFs that invest in unlisted PE funds are traded on many exchanges outside the 
US, including the London Stock Exchange and exchanges in Continental Europe.
Our sample comprises 26 listed FoFs. The aggregate value of the constituent 
unlisted PE funds in the portfolios of these FoFs is about 26% of the combined value of 
all listed PE funds in the VentureXpert database in 2007.
4 Although these FoFs do not 
invest in all available unlisted PE funds, the unlisted PE funds in which they do invest 
represent a large fraction of the PE fund universe. We determine the risk and return 
profile of the underlying portfolio of unlisted PE funds from the market prices for our 
sample of FoFs. 
The dataset we use has several advantages. First, it is free from selection bias. As 
Cochrane (2005) notes, “overcoming selection bias is the central hurdle” in evaluating 
the performance of PE investments. Moreover, we determine the value of investments 
from market prices and we do not rely on self-reported data for cash flow or valuation. 
3 Phalippou and Gottschalg (2009) discuss other explanations for the differences between the estimates of 
realized performance for PE investments in their paper and the estimates in Kaplan and Schoar (2005).  
4 We are able to precisely match approximately 60% of the unlisted PE funds held by the FoFs to 
corresponding observations in VentureXpert by name.3
Therefore, we are able to circumvent critical shortcomings of self-reported data used in 
extant studies.
Our approach extracts an estimate of the market’s ex-ante expectation of 
abnormal returns for PE investments from market prices. In contrast, the extant literature 
examines ex-post performances of unlisted PE funds. These studies find a wide range of 
abnormal returns, ranging from -6% in Phalippou and Gottschalg (2009) to 32% in 
Cochrane (2005). The findings in these papers provide interesting insights into past 
performances of PE funds in various datasets, based on different sets of assumptions. 
However, both investors and practitioners are interested in understanding what they can 
expect to earn in the long run through PE investments. 
The intuition behind our approach is straightforward. The listed FoFs in our 
sample are structured as closed-end funds. The relation between the market prices of 
these FoFs and the amount they invest in unlisted PE funds provides a measure of the 
value added by the underlying PE funds. However, FoFs charge an extra layer of 
management fees and performance fees. After taking into account the present value of 
these fees, the market value of their equity invested in unlisted PE funds enables us to 
estimate the abnormal return that these PE funds are expected to earn in the long run. 
We present an analytically tractable model to determine the range of possible 
values for FoF fees based on the fee structure we observe in the data. The results of this 
model provide upper and lower bounds for abnormal returns that the market expects from 
investments in underlying PE funds. We find that the market expects PE funds to earn 
abnormal returns greater than 0.25% and less than 2.25% for a fund with the typical fee 
structure (e.g. base management fee of 1.5% and incentive fee of 10%) with discounts 
between 5% and 19%. We use simulations that capture the actual fee structure of each 
individual FoF as well as the observed fund discount to narrow the range of plausible 
abnormal return expectations. Our results indicate that the expected abnormal return is 
between 0.3% and 1.2%. For a plausible range for the payout ratio of FoFs, i.e. from 0.3 
to 0.5, the ex ante estimate of the expected abnormal return is approximately 1%.  
While the wide range of estimates in the existing literature is based on particular 
datasets used in the respective studies as well as additional assumptions, our results imply 
that the market does not expect PE funds to earn such extreme abnormal returns in the 4
long run. Indeed, under any reasonable set of assumptions, we find that the market prices 
of FoFs are inconsistent with either negative expected abnormal returns or positive 
expected abnormal returns in excess of three percent in the long run. 
We also examine risk and returns of publicly traded funds that invest in private 
equity. We refer to these funds as listed private equity (LPE). LPEs are similar to unlisted 
PE funds in several respects. The managers of LPEs are compensated through 
management fees and performance fees similar to unlisted PE funds.
5 The LPEs also 
invest in private equity. These LPEs have the same opportunity sets as PE funds, to the 
extent that excess returns may be available to skilled investors who specialize in PE 
investments.  
However, there are several organizational differences between LPEs and unlisted 
PE funds that may lead to differences in values that they are able to capture. For example, 
Jensen (2007) argues that unlisted PE funds’ partnership structure may contribute to their 
value since they are not exposed to agency costs associated with diffusely owned publicly 
traded firms. Also, since PE funds have finite lives, they are committed to returning to 
their investors when they float funds in the future. Therefore, their reputational concerns 
provide them with an added incentive to perform. Since LPEs have an indefinite life, they 
are relatively insulated from such concerns. If any value that PE funds are able to add 
comes from the inherent incentives due to their organizational structure, then they would 
add more value than LPEs. Therefore, the return that the market expects LPEs to earn 
provides a lower bound on the returns unlisted PE funds would provide their LPs.   
We are also able to determine the risk characteristics of PE investment since we 
have market prices available for all of the listed private equity vehicles in our database. 
The extant literature attempts to estimate the risk characteristics of PE investments based 
on their cash payouts to investors and based on the valuations of these investments when 
they raise follow-up capital. Because it is difficult to determine the market values of all 
investments made by PE funds based on cash payouts or additional financing rounds for 
some of their investments, additional assumptions are necessary to determine the risk of 
5  Gompers and Lerner (1999) as well as Kaplan and Schoar (2005) find that the compensation scheme for 
PE funds are relatively homogeneous. Most funds use fee structure with a 1.5–2.5% annual management 
fee and a 20% incentive fee. 5
these investments. The estimates of systematic risk in this literature seem to depend 
significantly on these assumptions. For example, the estimates of beta range from about 
0.5 in Hwang, Quigley, and Woodward (2005) to 4.66 in Peng (2001). 
In related work, Martin and Petty (1983) and Brophy and Guthner (1988) use a 
samples of 11 and 12 listed venture capital funds, respectively, to examine their risk and 
ex-post returns over about a five-year period. Bilo, Christophers, Degosciu, and 
Zimmermann (2005) examine the risk and return characteristics of a larger sample of 
listed private equity. Although these studies use market prices of listed private equity 
investments, they also suffer from a selection bias since they require all firms in their 
samples to survive their entire sample period. 
The risk profile of FoFs and LPEs implies that unlisted PE funds have market 
betas close to one and positive loadings on Fama-French SMB factor. The performance 
of FoFs and LPEs are also positively related to GDP growth and negatively related to the 
credit spread even after controlling for the stock market. We also find that market returns 
of FoFs predict future changes in self-reported book values of unlisted private equity 
funds. This result indicates that the performance of FoFs provides vital information about 
the performance of the unlisted PE industry.  
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: Section II describes the 
sample. Section III provides estimates of market’s ex-ante expected abnormal returns for 
PE investments by unlisted PE funds and listed PE funds. Section IV examines the risk 
characteristics of the funds and Section V examines the sensitivity of PE investments to 
macroeconomic conditions. Section VI examines the ability of FoF and LPE returns to 
predict future changes in unlisted PE funds’ self reported book values and Section VII 
concludes.
II. Sample 
A.   PE Fund of Funds 
Unlisted PE funds are typically organized as limited partnerships. Outside investors have 
partnership interest in the funds as limited partners (LPs), and fund managers as general 
partners (GPs). PE fund of funds (FoFs) are intermediaries that raise funds from investors 
and invest in these PE funds as limited partners. In the US, only large institutions and 6
qualified wealthy investors who meet certain minimum wealth and income criteria are 
allowed to invest in unlisted PE funds.
Many other countries, however, do not have similar restrictions. Therefore, 
although the PE funds typically impose minimum thresholds for LP investments, small 
investors in Europe can invest in unlisted PE funds through FoFs. Some of these FoFs are 
listed on European and Australian stock exchanges and they are actively traded.
First, we identify FoFs from the SDC Platinum database and obtained a list of 
FoFs from the Dow Jones Private Equity Funds of Funds database. Next, we augment this 
data with the list of components for the S&P Listed Private Equity Index, PowerShares 
Listed Private Equity Fund, Power Shares International Listed Private Equity Fund, 
Listed Private Equity Index, and International Listed Private Equity Index. We match the 
names in this augmented list to the universe of traded stocks on Datastream. For the list 
of FoFs from these sources, we obtain annual reports from company websites and from 
industry sources for sample period (1994 to 2008). We examine each annual report to 
identify FoFs that invest at least 50% of their capital in PE funds and our final sample 
contains 26 FoFs.
Table 1a and 1b present descriptive statistics for our sample of FoFs. Ten FoFs in 
the sample are listed in London, 14 are listed in continental Europe and two are listed in 
Australia. The FoFs range in market capitalization from $14 million to $5.6 billion over 
our sample period. The average market capitalization of FoFs during our sample period is 
$314 million and the median is $214 million. Twenty of the 26 FoFs indicate that their 
main focus is buyout PE funds. Although these FoFs are traded outside the US, 11 of 
them focus on investments in North America. In terms of the value of investments, 68.6% 
of the assets are managed by FoFs that focus on North America. Therefore, although the 
FoFs are listed outside the US, a significant part of their investments flow to North 
America. The annual reports of these FoFs indicate that these funds invest in a wide 
variety of unlisted PE funds raised by well-known PE groups.
6 Since the median number 
of distinct unlisted PE funds held by each FoF is 28, the combined portfolio of all FoFs is 
a well-diversified portfolio of PE investments. The aggregate ownership by large 
6 Among others: Berkshire Fund VII, Blackstone Capital Partners V, Carlyle International Partners II, 
Goldman Sachs Capital Partners VI, KKR 2006 Fund, Lehman Brothers Venture Partners V, Vanguard 
VII, and Warburg Pincus Private Equity X. 7
investors, which is defined as investors with ownership of more than 3% of the shares 
outstanding, is about 47% on average. Therefore, even large investors invest through 
these vehicles.   
To examine the breadth of the unlisted PE funds held by FoFs, we compare the 
value all unlisted PE funds in the portfolios of FoFs with the PE fund universe from 
VentureXpert. The annual reports of all but one of the FoFs in our sample present a 
complete list of investments in unlisted PE funds. We compile an aggregate list of 
unlisted PE funds held by FoFs in as of 2007.
7 We attempt to match each fund by name 
with the PE funds in the VentureXpert database as of 2007 for which net asset value data 
are available. We precisely match 60% of unlisted PE fund investments held by FoFs to 
funds in the VentureXpert database by name. The aggregate value of the unlisted PE 
funds held by FoFs is 26.6% of the value of all the funds with net asset value data in 
VentureXpert. Therefore, the PE funds held by FoFs represent a substantial portion of the 
VentureXpert PE fund universe. 
B.   Listed Private Equity Funds  
Our primary source for listed private equity funds is the SDC Platinum database. The 
managers of LPEs classified as “funds” in the SDC data are compensated through 
management fees, as in the case of unlisted PE funds.
8 Table 2 presents the descriptive 
statistics for the sample of LPEs. There are a total of 129 LPEs in our sample. Ninety-two 
of these funds are listed in the London Stock Exchange and 16 are listed on US 
exchanges. The distribution of stage focus is much more diverse for LPEs than for FoFs.  
III. Expected abnormal returns from PE Investments  
We begin by analyzing the market’s expectation of the abnormal return for unlisted PE 
investments. Earlier papers in this literature follow the traditional approach and examine 
7 We do not have the 2007 annual reports for several funds. For each of these funds we use the analogous 
2006 report or 2008 report.    
8 To check the completeness of the SDC database, we examine a sample of stocks that were not classified 
in the SDC database as “funds” but were included as components of LPE indices such as the S&P Listed 
Private Equity Index. We find that stocks not classified in the SDC database as “funds” are holding 
companies for separate operating companies. These companies do not compensate their managers using the 
typical PE management fee structure associated “funds” in the SDC database. 8
the ex-post performance of unlisted PE funds. For example, Kaplan and Schoar (2005) 
and Ljungqvist and Richardson (2003) use cash inflows and outflows from samples of PE 
funds and investigate whether these funds outperformed their benchmarks.  
Ex-post return is the sum of ex-ante expected return and unexpected return. One 
can appeal to rational expectations, and assume that the mean of the unexpected 
component of returns is zero, and use ex-post returns as an unbiased measure of 
expected returns. In most situations, ex-ante expected returns are unobservable and 
hence ex-post realized return is the only feasible route to estimate expected returns. 
While ex-post return provides useful insights into past performance, it does not 
necessarily provide a measure of market’s expectation of returns that would be earned in 
the long term through investments in PE funds. Even ignoring the issue of selection bias, 
past performance may have been biased by unexpectedly good outcomes during the 
sample periods in earlier studies. For example, PE funds that invested in start-up 
companies may have unexpectedly benefited from the Internet boom and the generally 
stellar performance of Internet stocks that is probably unique to the 1990s. Therefore, 
because such unexpectedly good outcomes dominated the sample period in many 
studies, it is likely that the ex-post returns provide biased estimates of expected returns.  
A.   An Analysis of Funds of Funds 
A.1   Methodology 
The unique advantage with our FoF data is that we observe both the amount of money 
that the FoFs raise and their market value. The difference between the market value of the 
FoFs and the amount of funds that FoFs invest in unlisted PE funds represent the net 
present value (NPV) of the underlying unlisted PE fund investments. We determine the 
abnormal returns that the market expects from PE fund investments based on the NPV of 
these investments.  
While the economic basis for our methodology is straightforward, there are a few 
practical issues that we need to address. First, FoFs charge their own fees for managing 
the funds they raise. These fees are paid out of earnings from their investments, but the 
market capitalization of equity shares in the FoFs only reflects the present values of after-
FoF fee cash flows. Therefore, the market value of the funds invested by the FoFs in 9
underlying PE portfolio is the sum of the market capitalization of the traded shares of 
FoFs and the present value of FoF fees.  
Figure 1 illustrates our approach. FoFs invest the amount they raise at the IPO 
(after issuance costs) in unlisted PE funds. This is the book value of the initial investment 
in PE. The unobserved market value of this PE investment has two components. The first 
component is the market value of FoF equity, i.e. the value of the investors’ shares, and 
the second component is the value of FoF fees. The difference between the total market 
value of PE investments and the book value is the net present value of the underlying 
portfolio of PE investments. If the market expects positive abnormal returns from PE 
investments then the total market value is greater than the book value, as Panel A 
illustrates. However, if the market expects PE investments to earn negative abnormal 
returns then the total market value is less than the book value, as Panel B illustrates. 
Holding all else constant, the magnitude of the net present value reflects the magnitude of 
abnormal returns that the market expects the underlying PE funds to earn in the long run. 
The computation of the market value of traded shares is straightforward since we 
have data on prices and number of shares outstanding. The calculation of the present 
value of FoF fees, however, is less straightforward since claims to these fees are not 
traded. We use two approaches to compute the present value of FoF fees and extract 
market expectation of abnormal returns for PE investments. In the first approach, we use 
a theoretical model to derive analytic formulas for the present value of the FoF fees as a 
function of the market value of traded shares and the fee structure. This model uses 
simplifying assumptions about the fee structure for analytic tractability. However, we 
show that we can use the results of this model and observed FoF discounts to determine 
upper and lower bounds on the magnitude of abnormal returns that the market expects PE 
funds to earn.
In the second approach, we incorporate the actual fee structure. Since this more 
general model is not analytically tractable, we use Monte Carlo simulations to compute 
the present value of FoF fees. We determine market’s expectation of the abnormal return 
for PE fund investments using our simulation results and the observed average FoF 
discount.10
A.2   Market Value of Equity in FoFs 
The market value of FoF equity and the book value are key inputs for determining 
market’s expectations of abnormal returns for PE investments. We get the most accurate 
measure of the amount that FoFs actually invest in PE funds at the time of the initial 
public offering (IPO) of each FoF since the amount invested is raised in cash at that time. 
Therefore, in much of our analysis we will focus on valuation in the months immediately 
following the IPO.  
We first examine the relation between market prices and post-IPO book value or 
the net asset value (NAV) of FoFs. Specifically, we examine the FoF discount at time t,
defined as: 
t
t
t
Price
D1
NAV
  .                                    (1) 
We obtain prices and NAV data from Datastream. The NAV until the first financial 
statement after IPO is based on the value of funds raised at IPO. Since the NAV at this 
time accurately reflects the amount invested in underlying PE funds, we avoid any 
problems with self-reported NAVs of the underlying funds. As we progress through time, 
some of the investments get marked to NAV reported by the underlying PE funds. 
However, in the early stages of a FoF’s life, NAV is likely to be close to the dollar value 
of FoF investments since very few assets are marked up or down at that stage.  
Table 3 presents the average discounts for FoFs over the first 12 months after 
their IPOs. Although the FoFs are issued at a premium at IPOs (to cover issuance costs), 
they trade at a discount of approximately 3% three months after the IPO. The average 
discount gradually increases to approximately 12% by month 10 and fluctuates around 
this level for the remainder of the year.  
FoF discounts follow a similar path as discounts for U.S. closed end funds that 
invest in publicly traded stocks and bonds in Weiss (1989) and Peavy (1990). Closed-end 
funds are also issued at a premium, but they eventually trade at a discount. Weiss and 
Peavy report that the closed-end fund discount stabilizes at about 10% to 12% after six 
months subsequent to the IPOs. Since both FoFs and closed-end funds trade at substantial 
discounts, these funds are not expected to add sufficient value to justify their fees. 
Essentially, fund discounts imply that any additional value created by the abnormal 11
returns that the underlying PE funds are expected to generate is not sufficient to offset the 
fees that the FoFs charge. To calculate a more precise estimate of the market’s 
expectation about performance, we must take into account the present value of FoF fees 
in addition to the market value of FoF equity.   
Predictable underperformance of FoFs subsequent to the IPOs indicates that the 
IPO price does not reflect the true value of the underlying PE investments net of FoF 
fees. The results in Table 3 indicate that the discount stabilizes towards the end of the 
first year. Indeed, subsequent tests indicate that we do not find any abnormal returns after 
the initial period. This evidence indicates that the price after one year is reliable measure 
of the true value of traded shares. Therefore, we use the evidence that FoF discount is 
about 12% to determine market’s expectation of abnormal returns.  
A.3   Bounds on Expected Abnormal Returns 
In this subsection we analytically determine the present value of FoF fees as a function of 
the parameters of the fee structure, market’s expectation of abnormal returns, and other 
factors. These analytical results provide upper and lower bounds on market’s expectation 
of abnormal returns for the underlying portfolio of PE investments. As we show below, 
the distance between these bounds is fairly narrow and this range excludes many 
empirical estimates presented in the literature.   
The FoF fees have a fixed component and an incentive component.
9 The fixed 
component, or the base management fee, is specified as a fixed percentage of the assets 
managed by the FoF. The incentive component is specified as a percentage of profits that 
FoFs earn. The incentive fees are payable only if the NAV exceeds a high watermark, 
which is the highest NAV that the FoF had previously reached. Several funds also have a 
hurdle rate, and the incentive fee is payable as a percentage of the returns that exceed the 
hurdle rate. To make the model analytically tractable, we make some simplifying 
assumptions about the fee structure in this subsection. We assume that the fee structure 
comprises only a fixed fee and an incentive fee with no hurdle rate. We also assume in 
this subsection that the incentive fees are not subject to high watermark.  
                                                
9 In our sample all FoFs have a base management fee and 19 out of the 26 FoFs have an incentive fee. 12
Our model is specified as follows. Let  t NAV be the assets under management at 
time tand letO be the base management fee expressed as a fraction of t NAV . Let , ut R be
the return of the underlying PE fund portfolio held by the FoF (gross of FoF fees). We 
assume that ^ ` , ut R is independently and identically distributed. Let S  be the proportional 
incentive fee, which is computed as a fraction of the return after the base management fee 
is paid. Similarly, let T  be the proportional reinvestment rate (retention ratio), which is 
also computed as a fraction of the return after the base management fee. By construction, 
each FoF makes the following distributions at time t+1:

 

,1
,1
,1
Base Managment Fee = 
Incentive Fee  = 
Distribution to FoF Shareholders =  1
Retained Earnings =  ,
t
tu t
tu t
tu t
NAV
NAV R
NAV R
NAV R
O
SO
T SO
TO




 

 (2) 
To ensure that investors receive positive distributions on average, the sum of 
retention ratio (T ) and the proportional incentive fee (S ) must be less than unity. 
Consequently, the retention ratio has a range from zero to 1 S   and the payout ratio 
(1 T  ) has a range from S  to unity. In this context, the payout ratio is the proportion of 
 ,1 tu t NAV R O    that is distributed to investors or paid to the manager as the incentive 
fee. Given these distributions, the evolution of the net asset value is:  
  1, 1 1. tu tt NAV R NAV TO      (3) 
In general, the base management fee inherits some of the underlying fund risk as long as 
the fund retains a portion of its earnings for reinvestment. However, if all earnings are 
paid out as distributions to managers and shareholders, i.e. if  0 T   , then the base 
management fee is riskless. 
In addition to the simplifying features of the fee structure that we discussed 
earlier, the distribution we specify above also deviates from the actual fee structure if 
 ,1 0 ut R O   . Implicitly, this specification assumes that the FoF manager pays the fund 
if the fund return is lower thanO . However, FoF managers do not make such payments in 
practice. Instead, the high watermark condition reduces subsequent incentive 
compensation by the amount corresponding to any return shortfall. While our assumption 13
is analytically appealing, it changes the timing of cash flows to managers and understates 
the value of the incentive fee to the managers due to the time value of money. Therefore, 
we relax this assumption in our simulation analysis (see next subsection) to address any 
potential issues related to this bias. 
LetD be the abnormal return that the market expects the underlying portfolio of 
PE funds to earn. The expected return for the underlying PE portfolio is determined by 
the cost of capital according to the CAPM plus this expected abnormal return:
10
> @  , tu f utm f E RR E R R DE ªº     ¬¼  (4) 
where u E  is the underlying fund beta,  > @ tm E R  is the expected return on the market, and 
f R  is the riskfree rate.
11 We assume that all of these moments are constant for 
convenience.
The parameters of the model must satisfy two technical conditions. First, 
0 f R DO  ! to guarantee that the expectation of the risk-adjusted distribution to 
investors is positive, i.e., the cash flows that investors receive have positive economic 
value, and consequently, the price of the asset is strictly positive.
12 Second, 
 0 ff RR TD O  !  to guarantee that the transversality condition is satisfied, i.e., the 
value of the equity stake is finite because the risk-adjusted distributions do not grow 
faster than the riskfree rate.  
We assume that the valuation of each claim to the cash flows of the FoF is 
consistent with the CAPM. Essentially, the present value of distributions to investors and 
the present value of the management fees from the perspective of investors are both 
determined by participants in an efficient market governed by the CAPM. The present 
value of the distributions to investors, also known as FoF equity, is: 
                                                
10 Since PE funds invest at privately negotiated prices and may also implement operational changes, the 
expected return for these investments can deviate from CAPM depending on the level of managerial skill.  
11 Note that the return earned by the underlying portfolio is defined in this context using the quantity of 
money invested in the PE funds and not the market value of the underlying portfolio. The market value of 
the portfolio of underlying PE investments would incorporate the effect of any anticipated outperformance, 
and hence, in an efficient market the expected abnormal returns based on the market value of the 
underlying PE portfolio would be zero. 
12 In our sample the average base management fee is 1.5% and the average riskfree rate is 6%. Unless PE 
funds are expected to earn large negative abnormal returns, the condition 0 f R DO  !is satisfied.14
  
>@ 
1
,
1
1
1
ts ts
et t s
s te
RN A V
VE
ER
TS O f
 
 
ªº   «»  
«»  ¬¼
¦  (5) 
where > @ te ER is the discount rate for equity. Since distributions to shareholders are made 
after payment of base management fees, > @ te ER will usually be different from the 
discount rate for the underlying PE funds.
Proposition 1 below provides an analytic solution for the present value of 
investor’s claims stated in terms of the fund discount as well as an expression for the 
endogenously determined value of > @ te E R .
Proposition 1. The FoF discount and the associated discount rate for equity are specified 
by the following two equations:
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Proof: See appendix. 
The first expression indicates that the FoF discount is a decreasing function of the 
expected abnormal return and an increasing function of both the base fee and the 
incentive fee. The expression for the discount rate for equity implies that the systematic 
risk for the net-of-fee return is a scaled version of the systematic risk for the underlying 
portfolio. Since the base management fee is a fixed proportion paid before the 
distribution to shareholders, this obligation is similar to a debt obligation and magnifies 
the risk borne by equity holders. Therefore, the base fee increases the systematic risk 
faced by investors holding all else constant. Interestingly, the expression for the discount 
factor also indicates that the proportional reinvestment policy does not change the 
systematic risk of the investors’ claims. 
 We also determine the present value of the incentive fees,  , it V . Since the ratio of 
the incentive fee to the distribution to investors is S/(1–T–SProposition 1 implies that 
, it V  is given by:15
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The discount rate for the incentive fee, Ri, is equal to the discount rate for the 
distributions to investors. Both investors and fund managers have claims that are a fixed 
proportion of the underlying distribution net of the base fee.
Although the fee structure in the model makes simplifying assumptions, the 
results we derive in this subsection provide upper and lower bounds on market’s 
expectation of abnormal returns under the actual fee structures we observe in practice. 
First, we determine a lower bound. We proceed by addressing the following question. 
Given the level of FoF discount observe, what is the lowest possible level of market’s 
expectation of abnormal returns?  
As we discussed in the context of Figure 1, the difference between the NAV and 
the total market value of FoF investments is positively related to the expected abnormal 
return. We observe the NAV and the market value of equity. The only unobservable 
component of total market value is the value of FoF fees. For any given value of NAV 
and market value of equity, a smaller value of FoF fees would imply a smaller expected 
abnormal return. Therefore, if we find a lower bound for the value of FoF fees, then we 
also have a lower bound for the expected abnormal return. If we assume that the incentive 
fee is zero, i.e.  0 S   , then we have a lower bound for FoF fees. In addition, this 
assumption also implies that the hurdle rate and high watermark condition are irrelevant. 
Rearranging Equation (6) and setting  0 S   , yields the following lower bound l D :
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We use the same intuition to find an upper bound for the expected abnormal 
return as well. If we find an upper bound for the value of FoF fees, then there exists a 
corresponding upper bound for D . The value of FoF fees without a hurdle rate will be 
greater than the value with a positive hurdle rate. Since the hurdle rate in practice is non-
negative, the present value of incentive fee is an upper bound on the present value of the 16
incentive fee in practice.
13 Therefore, the D  in Equation (6) is itself an upper bound for 
the expected abnormal return because this equation was derived while ignoring the hurdle 
rate. Specifically, we get following upper bound  h D by rearranging Equation (6): 
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The average discount in Table 3 twelve months after FoFs’ IPOs is about 12% 
and the two standard deviation confidence interval around this point estimate ranges from 
5% to 19%. Figure 2 plots that upper and lower bounds of D  when the discount equals 
the point estimate of 12% and for discounts of 5% and 19%, which are the extreme points 
of the confidence interval. In this figure we set the risk-free rate ( f R ) equal to 6% (the 
historical average yield for long-term bonds during our sample period) and the base 
management fee (O ) equal to 1.5% (the average base management fee in our sample). To 
determine the upper bound we also set the incentive fee (S ) equal to 10% (the average 
incentive fee for FoFs that have an incentive fee). This value of Soverstates the average 
incentive fee for our sample because the sample includes FoFs that do not charge any 
incentive fees.  Hence, it provides an upper bound compared to the average incentive fee 
for the full sample (including FoFs that do not have any incentive fee).
Since the bounds are a function of market’s expectation of the retention ratio (T )
Figure 2 presents the bounds for payout ratios (1 T   ranging from 0.25 to 1. The 
average payout ratio during the sample period is approximately 0.3, but this average is 
not necessarily the market’s expectation of the ratio in the future. Because many of the 
funds in our sample are early in their life cycle, they may have artificially low payout 
ratios during this time period.  
We plot these upper and lower bounds as a function of the payout ratio for the 
three different valuation levels. Figure 2 indicates that the lower bound for D  is always 
13 This discussion overlooks the mismatch between the timing of incentive fee payments in the model 
compared to standard practice whenever the underlying portfolio return is sufficiently low. The value of 
incentive component of the management fee is understated due to the time value of money because 
negative incentive payments in the model are delayed in the real world to offset subsequent profits. 
However, for sufficiently high hurdle rates, disregarding the hurdle rate in the model more than 
counterbalances this understatement. Using our simulations we verify that Equation (10) does provide an 
upper bound on the market’s expectation of management skill for the average hurdle rate in the sample. 17
greater than 0.25% and the upper bound is always less than 2.25%. The difference 
between the upper and lower bounds on D for a given discount level and payout ratio is 
less than 1%. Thus, the model produces a relatively narrow range for the market’s 
expectation of D relative to the wide range of estimates offered in the literature. This 
range, however, indicates that the market considers PE investments as positive NPV 
projects net of the fees charged by the underlying PE funds. Hence, reasonable 
assumptions rule out negative expected abnormal returns.   
A.4   Expected Abnormal Returns – Simulation Results 
This subsection presents simulations designed to determine the market’s expectation of 
the abnormal return for unlisted PE funds. The simulations incorporate the hurdle rate 
and the high watermark features of the typical FoF fee structure that we observe in 
practice. They also correctly account for the fact that incentive fees are non-negative even 
if the underlying portfolio earns a negative return.
Our simulation methodology requires the selection of several parameter values. 
We assume that the riskfree rate is equal to 6%, based on the average Treasury bond rate 
during our sample period. We also assume the market risk premium is 4% and the 
standard deviation of stock market returns is 15% per year. In addition, we assume that 
1 E    for the underlying PE investments and that the fund-specific standard deviation is 
15% per year. We choose these parameters to be consistent with the actual values we 
observe in the data and we note that the results are not particularly sensitive to these 
parameter values.  
We simulate the annual return for the underlying portfolio of each fund using the 
single factor model with an adjustment for the level of the expected abnormal return. 
Each component of this annual portfolio return is drawn independently and identically 
over time from a normal distribution. We calculate the base management fee and the 
incentive fee using fund-specific base management rate, incentive rate, and hurdle rate 
for each particular fund. The base fee is a fixed proportion of the underlying portfolio 
value at the beginning of the period that is collected by the fund manager at the end of 
each period. The incentive fee is the maximum of a fraction of the underlying portfolio 
proceeds minus the base management fee that is above the hurdle rate and zero. The 18
incentive fee is subject to the typical hurdle rate and high watermark provisions. The 
payout ratio, in conjunction with the fund-specific base management rate, determines the 
distribution to investors. The lower bound of the distribution to investors is zero. Each 
fund reinvests the residual after all fees and distributions, i.e. retained earnings, in the 
underlying portfolio for the next period. Each sample path for returns is simulated for 300 
years and we repeat this process 5,000 times for each fund, holding the expected 
abnormal return and payout ratio constant. 
We calculate the present value of all distributions to investors using a constant 
discount rate. The discount rate for the distribution to investors depends on the systematic 
risk of these distributions. Since we derive the relevant theoretical beta in the last section 
under simplifying assumptions, the theoretical beta does not reflect the true beta for these 
distributions when we include the hurdle rate and high watermark provisions. Instead, we 
find the appropriate beta for these distributions using an iterative methodology.  
We use the betas from the analytical solution in the last subsection as the starting 
point. Next, we calculate the return for each period using the present value of subsequent 
distributions at the beginning of the current period, the present value of subsequent 
distributions at the beginning of the subsequent period, and the distribution at the end of 
the period. Then we use this return series and regress it on the simulated market return 
series. The coefficient estimate from this regression is the next iterative estimate for beta. 
We continue this process until difference between consecutive iterative estimates for beta 
is less than 0.001, i.e., the sequence converges. Once we have the appropriate beta for the 
distributions to investors for a particular fund, we calculate the relevant discount rate and 
the present value of these distributions for each sample path. We average these present 
value calculations and then we compute the simulated discount for the fund. We repeat 
this exercise for the expected abnormal return ranging from -3% to 3% in increments of 
1% and for the payout ratio ranging from 0.25 to 1 in increments of 0.05.
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Table 4 presents the simulated average of FoF discounts across funds for the 
expected abnormal return ranging from -2% to 2% and various levels of the payout ratio. 
As we would anticipate, the average fund discount decreases as D  increases because 
14 Since some funds have an incentive fee of 20%, the lower bound for the payout ratio of these funds must 
be greater than 0.2 (or 20%).  19
investors will be willing to pay more if they expect the underlying PE funds to earn 
higher returns holding all else constant. For a relatively low expected abnormal return, 
the discount decreases with the payout ratio. For example, if D  is equal to -2%, the 
average discount is 62% for a payout ratio of 0.25 compared to a discount of 28% when 
the payout ratio is 1. Intuitively, if abnormal performance is low relative to FoF fees, the 
market would prefer that each fund increase its payout ratio because reinvestment 
destroys value.
Analogously, the discount increases or the premium decreases with the payout 
ratio for large expected abnormal returns. For example, if D  is equal to 2%, the average 
premium is 18% if the payout ratio is 0.25 compared to a premium of only 2% if the 
payout ratio is 1. This result is also intuitive. The market would prefer that each fund 
decrease its payout ratio whenever abnormal performance is high relative to FoF fees 
because reinvestment in the underlying PE funds is a positive NPV project. Hence, the 
simulations indicate that high reinvestment magnifies the impact of abnormal 
performance relative to FoF fees.  
What levels of D  are consistent with the observed level of the average FoF 
discount that we observe in Table 3? Each curve in Figure 3 plots the simulated FoF 
discount for a given expected abnormal return as a function of the payout ratio, i.e. each 
curve is an iso-D curve. The horizontal line in Figure 3 reflects the statistical average FoF 
discount of 12%. Each intersection of an iso-D curve with this horizontal line is a 
possible combination of the expected abnormal return and the payout ratio that is 
consistent with market prices.  
This figure indicates that there is a relatively narrow range of possible expected 
abnormal returns that are consistent with the observed FoF discount of 12%. First, we 
consider the plausibility of substantial negative expected abnormal returns. Figure 3 
indicates that if the market expects the underlying PE funds to have an average abnormal 
return of less than -1% per year, the FoF discount would be then at least 20% which is 
more than two standard deviations greater than our point estimate of 12%. Hence the 
estimates of -6% to -3% abnormal returns in Phalippou and Gottschalg (2009) are 
significantly smaller than the market’s ex-ante expectation. Indeed, the horizontal line at 20
a discount of 12% is always below the iso-D for 0 D   , and hence, the market expects 
positive abnormal returns from the underlying portfolio of PE funds. 
Figure 3 also implies that ifD is greater than or equal to 2%, FoFs would trade at a 
premium, rather than a discount, for any expectation of the payout ratio. Intuitively, if 
D equals 2%, then the abnormal returns PE funds earn will more than compensate for 
FoF fees. In this case, the smallest possible premium is 2.3% (discount of -2.3%), i.e, 
more than four standard deviations away from the average discount of 12%. Therefore, 
many of the large estimates of D  in the literature based on ex-post performance are much 
greater than the level anticipated by the market.  
While Figure 3 does not extend the curves to include payout ratios lower than 
0.25 due to technical restrictions imposed by the large incentive fees of some FoFs in the 
sample, analyzing such a payout ratio for funds with lower incentive fees would not 
change our findings. Note that iso-D curves outside the range of 0% and 2% diverge from 
the horizontal line as the payout ratio decreases to 0.25. This divergence pattern would 
continue for lower payout ratios because the impact of abnormal performance relative to 
fees is magnified by reinvestment.  Hence, our results indicate that the market expects 
D to be between 0 and 2% regardless of the market’s expectation of the payout ratio. If 
we consider a plausible payout ratio range, such as 0.3 to 0.5, a more detailed version of 
Figure 3 would indicate that the expected abnormal return is bounded between 0.8% and 
1.2%, or approximately 1%.
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B.   An Analysis of Listed Private Equity Funds (LPEs) 
This section examines whether LPEs add value. LPEs and PE funds have similar 
operational focus since they both invest in private equity. LPE managers are also 
compensated through management fees and at least in some cases, with incentive fees. 
However, there are several differences in the organizational structure that could lead to 
performance differences between LPEs and PEs. Since LPEs are closed end funds with 
indefinite life they do not have the same reputational concerns as PE funds. In fact, the 
typical discount in the case of closed-end fund suggests that the organizational structure 
15 We also examined the simulated discount for a range of alternative parameter values for market volatility 
and the risk premium. These variations do not dramatically change the pattern of results.  21
of LPEs would result in agency costs such as unduly high fees or less than optimal effort 
on the part of fund managers.
In contrast, several papers have argued that PE funds’ incentive structure aligns 
their interests with that of limited partners. Also, since PE funds have finite life, they are 
committed to returning to their investors for funds they float in the future and reputational 
concerns provide them with an added incentive to perform. Therefore, the organizational 
structure of PE funds may incentivize them to add more value than that of LPEs.  
Since LPEs likely suffer from higher agency costs, we would expect them to 
underperform PE funds. Since they both operate in the same PE space, but LPEs have 
higher agency costs, the expected performance of LPEs provides a lower bound on the 
expected performance of PE funds. The difference between the expected performances of 
LPEs and PEs would provide a quantitative measure of the agency costs.  
To investigate whether the market expects LPEs to earn abnormal returns, we 
examine the discounts for these LPEs soon after their IPOs. As we discussed earlier, 
discounts ratio based on the IPO price are likely to be a biased indicator of market 
expectations. Therefore, we first examine the pattern of LPE discount in event time after 
IPOs. We use the beginning of the first month when data are available on Datastram as 
the IPO date.   
Table 5 presents the discount over the first 12 months after IPOs. LPEs trade on 
average at a 4% premium to NAV at the end of their first month. However, the premium 
declines to about 1.9% by the end of six months. By the end of 12 months after IPO, the 
LPEs trade at a discount of 1.7%. These results indicate that although the IPO premium 
disappears by the end of 12 months, LPE price is close to its NAV. Therefore, the market 
expects LPEs to have abnormal returns close to zero.  
IV.  Risk Characteristics of FoFs and LPEs 
The extant literature provides a wide range of estimates for systematic risk of PE 
investments. For example, the estimates of beta range from about 0.5 in Hwang et al. 
(2005) to 4.66 in Peng (2001). This wide range illustrates the difficulty in estimating 
betas for these investments. To a large extent, the difficulty arises from the fact that these 22
studies estimate betas from investment cash flows rather than from market prices. As 
result, the beta estimates depend on the underlying assumptions. 
In turn, the difficulty in estimating the risk of PE funds precludes the reliable 
evaluation of the performance of PE funds. For example, Phalippou and Gottschalg’s 
(2009) analysis show that the measured performance is quite sensitive to reasonable 
changes in assumptions about beta. In their sample, the abnormal returns for PE funds 
changes from -3% per year when they assume beta is equal to one, to -6% per year when 
they assume an “industry/size-matched cost-of-capital.”  
This section examines the systematic risk of FoFs and LPEs. Since we have 
market prices, we are able to estimate multiple dimensions of risk using traditional time 
series regressions. This section present systematic risk measured with respect single 
factor and multifactor models. In addition, we also present the sensitivity of FoF and LPE 
performances to macroeconomic risks. To examine the systematic risk of PE investments, 
we construct value-weighted indices of FoFs and LPEs. Each month we include all funds 
in the relevant group with the necessary price and return information. 
A.  Market Risk and Fama-French Factor Risks 
We examine systematic risk in the context of CAPM and the Fama-French (1993) and 
Carhart (1997) four-factor models. Since our FoF and LPE samples comprise 
international funds, we use MSCI world index as the appropriate proxy for the market 
factor. We also examine the systematic risk with respect to the S&P 500 index to 
examine the sensitivity of our indices to US markets. We fit the following time series 
regressions to estimate systematic risk:  
,, , ,,, , , , () it f t i im mt f t is m b t ih m l t im o m t it R R R R SMB HML MOM DE E E E H         , (11) 
where , it R  is the fund index return and  , ft R  is the risk-free rate. We use one-month U.S. 
Treasury Bill rate as risk-free rate.  , ,and  SMB HML MOM are the size, book-to-market 
and momentum factor portfolios. We obtain factor portfolio returns from Kenneth 
French’s website. We note that these three factors are constructed only from US stocks. 
Given the international composition of fund portfolios, we would ideally like to use 
international factors but we are constrained to use US factors because we do not have 23
international factor data. Nevertheless, since the US equity market is the largest part of 
any world portfolio, the sensitivity of the fund indices to the US factors will shed 
important insights into the nature of PE risk.  
Table 6 presents the regression estimates and corresponding Newey-West 
standard errors with six lags. Betas with respect to the MSCI World index for the FoFs 
and LPEs are 0.93 and 0.84, and with respect to the S&P 500 index are 0.80 and 0.71, 
respectively. The R
2s are also larger with respect to the MSCI index. Since the underlying 
funds have international exposures, both FoF and LPEs have higher sensitivity to the 
MSCI World index, and the MSCI index has a larger explanatory power than the S&P 
500 index.
Table 7 presents the regression estimates for the four-factor model. With the 
MSCI index as the market factor, the betas with respect to the SMB factor are 0.44 and 
0.54 for the FoF and LPE indices respectively, and both these estimates are significantly 
greater than zero. Therefore, both FoFs and LPEs behave more like small firms than large 
firms. This finding is intuitive since many of the PE investments are made in firms that 
are smaller than a typical listed firm.  
The beta with respect to HML is 0.35 for FoFs and 0.39 for LPEs. Although these 
point estimates are not significantly different, HML beta is not significantly different 
from zero for FoFs but it is significant for LPEs. Therefore, both FoFs and LPEs are more 
sensitive to value firms than growth firms. One possible explanation for this finding is 
that these funds have significant investments in buyouts and targets of buyouts are 
perhaps more likely to be value firms than growth firms. In unreported results, we 
examined the betas from a four-factor model separately for funds with buyout focus and 
venture capital (VC) focus. We found that buyout funds’ HML beta estimate was 
significantly positive but VC funds’ HML beta estimate was not significantly different 
from zero. Therefore, even VC funds on average are not sensitive to the growth factor.
Overall, we find that the risk profiles of FoFs and LPEs are quite similar. The 
betas with respect to various risk factors are not statistically different for these two 
categories of funds. Although the geographic composition of the FoFs and LPEs are 
different, the similarities indicate that their risk structures are not particularly different.  24
As we discussed earlier, private PE funds and LPEs differ in their organizational 
structure because LPEs have indefinite life while PE funds have finite life and they are 
likely to be more sensitive to reputational concerns because they are constrained to 
periodically go back to the market to raise funds for future operations. Our earlier 
findings indicate that PE funds add more value than LPEs, which is likely due to this 
organizational difference. However, this difference between PE funds and LPEs need not 
necessarily affect their risk exposure since they operate in the same space.  
Our analysis of the implications of the FoF fee structure showed that FoF equity 
might be viewed as a levered claim on the underlying PE funds because the base 
management fee is equivalent to debt contract. Therefore, the market beta of FoF equity 
provides an upper bound for the market beta of the underlying portfolio of PE funds.  
Conceptually, we could “unlever” the FoF betas based on our analysis in Section 
III. The practical impact of accounting for the implicit leverage effect due to the base 
management fee, however, may not be as large. For example, Kaplan and Stein (1990) 
find that the even when firms increase the debt in their capital structure from about 25% 
of their capital to about 81% the change in equity betas is “surprisingly small.” Therefore, 
the true betas of the underlying PE funds may be closer to the FoF equity betas than what 
is suggested by the leverage effect due to base management fee.  
In earlier work, Kaplan and Schoar (2005) acknowledge the difficulty in 
estimating betas because of “the lack of true market values for fund investments until the 
investments are exited” and assume that beta equals one. Phalippou and Gottschalg 
(2009), however, conjecture that “the assumption of a beta as 1 is likely to overstate 
relative performance” and they use an industry/size-matched cost-of-capital benchmark. 
However, our findings indicate that the betas for FoFs and LPEs are not significantly 
different from one.
B. Alphas
The alphas for FoFs and LPEs are on average not different from zero both with CAPM 
and four-factor benchmark. These results indicate that these funds on average performed 
as expected, conditional on the realizations of the risk factors. Essentially, the market was 
not surprised ex-post by the performance of this asset class. Thus, the discount one year 25
after the IPO does not appear to be biased by any systematic error in the expectations of 
market participants. We would like to caution that these estimated alphas should not be 
used as a measure of whether or not PE investments themselves are able to earn abnormal 
returns. In an efficient market, the market would anticipate any potential ability of PEs to 
earn abnormal returns above their cost of capital, and this ability will be reflected in 
market prices. Therefore, the market price-based returns earned by PEs should only 
compensate investors for systematic risk. 
V.   FoF and LPE Performance and Economic Environment 
This section examines the relation between fund performance and macroeconomic 
activity. We use US GDP growth and credit spread to capture macroeconomic activity 
and we fit the following regression:
,, , ,,, , , () i t f t i i m m t f t i GDP t i credit t i t R R R R GDP Credit Spread DE G G H      '      (12) 
where GDP '  is percentage real GDP growth and credit spread is the difference between 
the yield on BAA and AAA rated corporate bonds.
16 For ease of interpretation, we 
standardize both  GDP ' and Credit Spread by demeaning them and dividing them by 
their respective standard deviation. Therefore, the slope coefficients denote fund returns 
for one standard deviation change in these variables. We use MSCI world index as the 
market portfolio in the results we report.
17
GDP growth would have a positive impact on fund performance after controlling 
for contemporaneous market returns if macroeconomic risk have a greater effect on early 
stage firms than on large cap firms that form a large part of the market index. Healthy 
GDP growth could potentially allow private firms to access capital markets and go 
public, which would have a positive impact on PE investments. 
However, economic growth also could attract greater competition. For instance, 
Gompers and Lerner (2000) find that valuation becomes richer and hence the increased 
competition that comes with economic growth may have a negative impact on fund 
                                                
16  We obtain the data regarding macroeconomic activity from the St. Louis Federal Reserve website. 
17  We find similar results when we use the S&P 500 index as the market portfolio. In addition, IPO volume 
is not significantly related to the performance of the FoF index or the LPE index after controlling for GDP 
growth and the credit spread and the inclusion of IPO volume does not qualitatively change the estimates 
for the other regressors. 26
performance. Kaplan and Schoar (2005) report that funds started when there is increased 
competition tend to underperform other funds, and find support for hypothesis that 
performance suffers when money chases deals. The net effect of the positive impact of 
economic growth and the negative impact of increased competition on the cost of future 
investments depends on which of these effects dominate.  
Credit spread also provides a measure of the economic environment. Koopman, 
Kräussl, Lucas, and Monteiro (2009), among others, show that credit spread is 
countercyclical. As Fama (1990) argues, widening spread generally signals deteriorating 
business conditions, which would make it difficult times for private firms to go public. 
Moreover, widening credit spread also increases the cost of raising new debt and hence it 
would likely have an adverse impact on the performance of private firms. Therefore, we 
expect a negative relation between the performance of PE funds and credit spread.  
Table 8 reports the estimates for equation (12). We find that GDP growth is 
positively related to returns for both FoFs and LPEs. One standard deviation change in 
GDP growth leads to 2.04% and 1.29% increase in excess returns for FoFs and LPEs, 
respectively. Our results indicate that the increase in the value of existing investments of 
PE funds more than offset the negative impact of potentially increased competition on 
returns from future investments.  
We also find that credit spreads are negatively related to FoF and LPE returns, 
after controlling for market returns and also after accounting for GDP growth. FoFs are 
more sensitive to credit spreads than LPE and the difference in the slope coefficients is 
significant at the five percent level. One possible explanation for this difference is that 
because the PE funds that underlie FoF investments may be hurt more by deteriorating 
capital markets because of their finite life. The LPEs may not have the same urgency to 
liquidate their investments in unfavorable market conditions as PE funds because of their 
indefinite life.   
VI.  PEPI and Fund Indices 
Practitioners and industry sources such as the National Venture Capital Association use 
the Private Equity Performance Index (PEPI) to measure the performance of PE funds. 
Thomson Reuters computes PEPI based on cash flows from the PE funds in the Thomson 27
database, based on self-reported book values of these funds. As Phalippou and Gottschalg 
(2009) and others have noted, self-reported book values tend to be overstated.
Any bias aside, self-reported book values may not reflect changes in their market 
values in a timely manner. For instance, book values reported by funds may only partially 
adjust to changes in their true value. Under this partial adjustment hypothesis, PEPI 
would not reflect true changes in the value of PE investments in a timely manner since 
smoothed book values are used to compute PEPI.  
In contrast to PEPI, we compute the FoF and LPE indices using market prices. 
Since market prices reflect fundamental values in a timely manner, these indices should 
be able to predict changes in PEPI under the partial adjustment hypothesis. To examine 
whether FoFs and LPE indices can predict future changes in book values that underlie 
PEPI, we examine the relation between PEPI returns and contemporaneous and lagged 
values of MSCI World index returns and fund index returns.
Table 9 reports the regression results. Since PEPI is published quarterly, we fit the 
regressions with quarterly returns. The slope coefficient in univariate regression with 
MSCI as the independent variable is 0.39, which is statistically significant. This slope 
coefficient is significantly smaller than the analogous coefficient for FoFs, which may be 
due to the fact that PEPI is computed using data from PE funds that largely invest in US 
companies, while the FoFs invest in international PE funds. Partial adjustment of book 
values used in the computation of PEPI will also result in a smaller slope coefficient 
because the slope coefficient estimate for contemporaneous returns will understate the 
true sensitivity of PE funds to the stock market. 
To test the delayed adjustment hypothesis, we include both the contemporaneous 
and lagged MSCI World returns in the regression specification. In addition, we also add 
contemporaneous and lagged returns on the FoF index as additional explanatory 
variables. Since FoF returns reflect changes in the value that are unique to the PE sector, 
lagged FoF returns should be able to incrementally predict PEPI returns under the 
delayed adjustment hypothesis. 
The results in column 6 of Table 9 indicate that the slope coefficients on lagged 
MSCI World and FoF index returns are at 0.09 and 0.11, respectively, both statistically 
significant. Therefore, both lagged MSCI World and FoF index returns are useful in 28
predicting PEPI returns. In fact, the predictive power of lagged FoF index return is at 
least as strong as that of lagged MSCI World index returns although the FoF index return 
is much noisier since it is constructed with only 26 FoFs. We found similar results when 
we used LPE index returns in the place of FoF index returns. These results support the 
delayed adjustment hypothesis and imply that this index provides crucial information 
about the performance of the unlisted PE industry.
VII. Conclusion 
We estimate the risk and expected returns on private equity investments based on 
the market prices of exchange traded funds of funds that invest in unlisted private equity 
funds. We also examine the risk and expected returns of listed private equity funds. Our 
results indicate that the market expects unlisted private equity funds to earn abnormal 
returns of about zero to two percent. We also find that the market expects listed private 
equity to earn zero to marginally negative abnormal returns net of their fees.
Earlier studies document abnormal returns for PE funds that range from -6% (e.g 
Phalippou and Gottschalg, 2009) to +32% (Cochrane, 2005). While these estimates are 
based on the datasets used in the respective studies and additional assumptions, our 
results indicate that the market does not expect PE funds to earn such extreme abnormal 
returns in the long run. In fact, we show that any proposition that the market expects 
negative abnormal returns, or positive abnormal returns in excess of about two percent in 
the long run are inconsistent with the market prices that we observe. 
Since we use data for FoFs in our empirical analysis, our estimates of the 
expected abnormal return for the portfolio of unlisted PE investments includes any ability 
that FoFs might have in selecting unlisted PE funds, i.e. selection skill of FoFs, in 
addition to the ability of the average unlisted PE fund manager to outperform public 
equity, i.e. management skill. We cannot disentangle selection skill from management 
skill solely based on data for FoFs. But in a related context, Fung and Hseih (2000) find 
that the performance of hedge fund FoFs and the general population of hedge funds are 
about equal after accounting for selection bias in hedge fund databases and the fees of 
hedge fund FoFs. Their results indicate that FoFs exhibit little selection skill for hedge 29
funds. To the extent that their findings can be generalized, the selection skill of FoFs for 
PE funds is unlikely to be a significant factor. 
Both listed and unlisted private equity funds have betas close to one and they have 
positive betas on Fama-French SMB factor. Private equity fund returns exhibit positive 
correlation with GDP growth and negative correlation with credit spread. Finally, we find 
that market returns of listed fund of funds and listed private equity predict future changes 
in self-reported book values of unlisted private equity funds. 30
A. Appendix
We assume that the CAPM determines the market value of each claim. The value of the 
base management fee,  , bt V , is the starting point of our analysis. Each period's base 
management fee is proportional to a stochastic process because a portion of the proceeds 
is reinvested. Hence, the appropriate discount rate, > @, tb ER depends on the retention ratio 
and the systematic risk of the underlying portfolio: 
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The present value of the fixed fees is proportional to the amount invested in the 
underlying portfolio, i.e. , bt t VN A V G   . We find the discount rate, > @ tb ER, as well as the 
proportionality constant,G , starting from the following equation: 
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We use the evolution of net asset value and rearrange this equation: 
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Substituting the expected return for the underlying portfolio and rearranging again 
yields an expression for  > @ tb ERin terms of: 
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Similarly, we write the actual return, ,1 bt R  :
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The systematic risk of the base fee, b E , is equal to u TE . Hence, the CAPM indicates 
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The expected return is the riskfree rate plus an adjustment for the systematic riskiness of 
the fees based on reinvestment. In the absence of any reinvestment, the discount rate 
is f R .
We rearrange to solve forG as a function of the parameters: 
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Therefore, the present value of the base management fee relative to net asset value and 
the associated discount rate are given by the following two equations: 
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In the absence of any market inefficiencies, the price of the investors' claim t P  is 
equal to the present value of the distributions to investors,  , et V :
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Analogously, the present value of the distributions to investors is proportional to 
the amount invested in the underlying portfolio, i.e.  , et t VN A V K   . We find the discount 
rate, > @ te ER, as well as the proportionality constant,K , starting from the following 
equation:
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Again, we use the evolution equation for net asset value and rearrange: 
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Substituting the expected return for the underlying portfolio and rearranging again 
yields an expression for  > @ te E R in terms of . K
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Similarly, we write the actual return, ,1 et R  :
  ,1 ,1 ,1
1
et f u mt f ut RR R R
TS
TDO E H
K
 
§· 
       ¨¸
©¹
 .  (A14) 
The systematic risk of the base fee, , b E is equal to   1/ u TS K T E   . Hence, the 
CAPM indicates 
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We rearrange to solve for K as a function of the parameters: 
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Therefore, the present value of the distributions to investors relative to net asset value and 
the associated discount rate are given by the following two equations: 
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Table 1a. Sample Statistics – Funds of Funds 
Notes: This table presents sample statistics for our sample of twenty-six private equity funds of 
funds (FoFs). The sample period is 1994 to 2008. 
Panel A: Exchange 
 N  %  %  USD  Active  %  Dead  % 
US 0 0.0%  0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
Europe 14 53.9%  68.9% 14 53.9%  0  0.0% 
London  10 38.5%  30.9% 10 38.5%  0  0.0% 
Australia  2 7.7%  0.3% 1 3.9% 1 3.8% 
Total  26 100%  100% 25 96.2% 1  3.8% 
Panel B: Size 
N %  %  USD  Active  %  Dead  % 
<20m  0 0.0%  0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
20m - 100m   7 26.9%  2.9%  6 23.1% 1  3.8% 
100m - 500m  12 46.2%  31.3% 12 46.2%  0  0.0% 
500m - 1000m  3 11.5%  17.4% 3 11.5% 0  0.0% 
1000m – 2500m  3 11.5%  30.7% 3 11.5% 0  0.0% 
>2500m  1 3.9%  17.7%  1 3.9% 0 0.0% 
Total  26 100%  100% 25 96.2% 1  3.8% 
Panel C: Stage Focus 
Total %  %  USD  Active  % Dead % 
Early-Stage 2 7.7%  2.3% 2 7.7% 0 0.0% 
Expansion  2 7.7%  2.2% 2 7.7% 0 0.0% 
Balanced 0 0.0%  0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
Buyout  20 76.9%  87.7% 19 73.1%  1  3.8% 
Other PE  2 7.7%  7.8% 2 7.7% 0 0.0% 
Total  26 100%  100% 25 96.2% 1  3.8% 
Panel D: Geographical Focus 
N %  %  USD  Active  %  Dead  % 
North America  11 42.3%  68.6% 11 42.3%  0  0.0% 
Europe 11 42.3%  29.2% 11 42.3%  0  0.0% 
Rest of the World  4 15.4%  2.3%  3 11.5% 1  3.8% 
Total  26 100.0%  100.0% 25  96.2%  1  3.8% 35
Table 1b: Descriptive Statistics – Funds of Funds 
Notes: This table reports descriptive statistics for twenty-six funds of funds (FoFs) for the period 
1994 to 2008. The first column for every variable shows the median while the second shows the 
average. Market capitalization is the number of shares outstanding multiplied by price per share 
in millions of USD.  Institutional ownership is the percentage of outstanding shares for each FoF 
held by institutional investors. Underlying PE Funds is the number of distinct unlisted PE funds 
held by the FoF.
Median Average 
Market Capitalization  203.8 312.4 
Base Management Fee  1.50% 1.40% 
Incentive Fee  10.00% 10.73% 
Hurdle rate  8.00% 9.54% 
Institutional Ownership  46.59% 47.15% 
Underlying PE Funds  28 42 36
Table 2. Sample Statistics – Listed Private Equity Funds 
Notes: This table presents the sample statistics for our sample of 129 listed private equity funds 
(LPEs). The sample period is 1994 to 2008. 
Panel A: Exchange 
N %  %  USD  Active  %  Dead  % 
US 16 12.4%  59.3% 16 12.4%  0  0.0% 
Europe 7 5.4%  0.9% 5 3.9% 2 1.6% 
London  92 71.3%  32.7% 81 62.8% 11  8.5% 
Rest of the World  14 10.9%  7.1%  9  7.0%  5  3.9% 
Total  129 100.0%  100.0% 111  86.1%  18  14.0% 
Panel B: Size 
N %  %  USD  Active  %  Dead  % 
<20m  28 21.7%  1.3%  22 17.1%  6  4.7% 
20m - 100m   67 51.9%  11.2% 57 44.2% 10  7.8% 
100m - 500m  26 20.2%  31.2% 25 19.4%  1  0.8% 
500m - 1000m  5 3.9%  11.6%  4 3.1% 1 0.8% 
1000m - 2500  0 0.0%  0.0% 0 0.0% 0 0.0% 
>2500m  3 2.3%  44.7%  3 2.3% 0 0.0% 
Total  129 100.0%  100.0% 111  86.1%  18  14.0% 
Panel C: Stage Focus 
N %  %  USD  Active  %  Dead  % 
Early-Stage 25 19.4%  4.7%  18 14.0%  7  5.4% 
Expansion  34 26.4%  26.0% 30 23.3%  4  3.1% 
Balanced 44 34.1%  13.8% 40 31.0%  4  3.1% 
Buyout  13 10.1%  13.4% 11  8.5%  2  1.6% 
Other PE  13 10.1%  42.1% 12  9.3%  1  0.8% 
Total  129 100.0%  100.0% 111  86.1%  18  14.0% 
Panel D: Geographical Focus 
N %  %  USD  Active  %  Dead  % 
North America  17 13.2%  46.0% 17 13.2%  0  0.0% 
Europe 78 60.5%  21.4% 68 52.7% 10  7.8% 
Rest of the World  34 26.4%  32.6% 26 20.2%  8  6.2% 
Total  129 100.0%  100.0% 111  86.1%  18  14.0% 37
Table 3. FoF Discount in Event Time 
Notes: This table reports the average fund discounts in event time for exchange-traded funds of 
funds (FoFs) that invest in unlisted private equity funds. Event month 1 is the first month after the 
initial public offering; event month 2 is the second month, and so on.  
Event Month  Average Discount  Standard Error  t-statistic
1 -3.06%  0.52%  -5.93 
2 0.63%  1.84%  0.34 
3 2.87%  1.79%  1.60 
4 5.47%  1.88%  2.91 
5 7.72%  2.04%  3.78 
6 7.50%  2.60%  2.89 
7 8.77%  2.50%  3.51 
8 10.37%  2.79% 3.71 
9 10.57%  2.58% 4.10 
10 11.64% 2.74%  4.24 
11 12.09% 2.85%  4.24 
12 11.54% 3.53%  3.27 38
Table 4. Simulated FoF Discount
Notes: This table reports the average (across funds) of the simulated FoF discount for each particular combination of the payout ratio and the 
expected abnormal return. We calculate the discount for each fund as unity minus the average simulated present value of all distributions to 
investors divided by the initial NAV of the fund. We compute the relevant present value of FoF equity separately for each FoF using the fund-
specific fee structure. These calculations are based on 5,000 fund-specific performance simulations. The simulation methodology is discussed in 
greater detail in the text. The expected abnormal return (D) is the market’s expectation of the abnormal return for the underlying portfolio of PE 
investments. The payout ratio is the fraction of a fund’s earnings that is paid out to equity holders.   
Payout Ratio (1-T)   Expected Abnormal Return (D)
 -2%  -1%  0  1%  2% 
0.25 62.52% 53.19% 40.09% 18.29% -17.91% 
0.50 43.94% 34.97% 24.09% 10.69% -6.13% 
0.75 33.99% 26.01% 17.72% 7.35% -3.41% 
1 27.65% 20.78% 13.49% 6.03% -2.29% 39
Table 5: LPE Discount in Event Time 
Notes: This table reports the average discount in event time for listed private equity funds. Event 
month 1 is the first month after the initial public offering; event month 2 is the second month, and 
so on.
Event Month  Average Discount  Standard Error  t-statistic
1 -4.08%  1.87%  -2.18 
2 -4.48%  2.00%  -2.24 
3 -3.31%  2.11%  -1.57 
4 -3.76%  1.98%  -1.90 
5 -2.66%  2.16%  -1.23 
6 -1.88%  2.12%  -0.89 
7 -1.70%  2.15%  -0.79 
8 -1.52%  2.12%  -0.72 
9 1.54%  2.30%  0.67 
10 -0.04% 2.22% -0.02 
11 0.96% 2.13% 0.45 
12 1.74% 2.26% 0.77 40
Table 6. The Performance of Private Equity (CAPM) 
Notes: This table reports market model regression estimates for value weighted FoF and LPE 
indices. We use MSCI World or S&P 500 indices as market proxies. One-month Treasury bill 
rate is the riskfree rate. The dependent variables are excess returns on the indices reported in the 
column headings. The standard errors are based on the Newey-West estimator with 6 lags (in 
parentheses). The sample period is from January 1994 to December 2008.
 FoF  FoF  LPE  LPE 
Intercept  0.0002 -0.0005 -0.0017 -0.0023 
  (0.0051) (0.0058) (0.0035) (0.0042) 
MSCI  World  0.9227***  0.8384***  
  (0.1956)  (0.1827)  
S&P  500   0.7999***  0.7071*** 
   (0.2128)  (0.2026) 
R
2 0.3881 0.3043 0.3843 0.2851 
Observations  180 180 180 180 
*** - Significant at the 1% level.41
Table 7. The Performance of Private Equity (4-Factor Model) 
Notes: This table reports the four-factor model estimates for value-weighted FoF and LPE indices. We use MSCI World or S&P 500 indices as 
market proxies. One-month treasury rate is the riskfree rate. SMB and HML Fama-French size and book-to-market factors, respectively, and UMD 
is momentum factor. The dependent variables are excess returns on the indices reported in the column headings. The standard errors are based on 
the Newey-West estimator with 6 lags (in parentheses). The sample period is from January 1994 to December 2008. 
 FoF  FoF  LPE  LPE 
Intercept  -0.0023 -0.0038 -0.0045 -0.0058 
  (0.0060) (0.0068) (0.0041) (0.0048) 
MSCI  World  0.9943***  0.9093***  
  (0.2272)  (0.1924)  
S&P  500   0.9244***  0.8338*** 
   (0.2498)  (0.2173) 
SMB  0.4354*** 0.5421*** 0.5389*** 0.6349*** 
  (0.1344) (0.1532) (0.1463) (0.1648) 
HML 0.3529  0.3912  0.3949*  0.4236* 
  (0.2192) (0.2470) (0.2221) (0.2426) 
MOM  0.0609 0.0876 0.0543 0.0756 
  (0.0786) (0.0895) (0.0566) (0.0540) 
R
2 0.4507 0.3954 0.4937 0.4299 
Observations  180 180 180 180 
* - Significant at the 10% level.
*** - Significant at the 1% level.42
Table 8. The Impact of the Macroeconomic Environment on the Performance of Private Equity 
Notes: This table reports the estimates of a regression of excess returns on value-weighted FoF and LPE indices on MSCI world index, GDP 
growth and credit spread. One month Treasury bill rate is the riskfree rate. Both GDP growth and the credit spread are de-meaned and scaled by 
their standard deviations. The dependent variables are excess returns on the indices reported in the column headings. The standard errors are based 
on the Newey-West estimator with 6 lags (in parentheses). The sample period is from January 1994 to December 2008.
Dependent Variable: LPE Index Excess Return 
FoF FoF FoF LPE  LPE  LPE 
Intercept  0.0004 0.0006 0.0006 -0.0012 -0.0015 -0.0015 
  (0.0037) (0.0038) (0.0034) (0.0028) (0.0028) (0.0027) 
MSCI  World  0.7961*** 0.7270*** 0.7101*** 0.7587*** 0.7152*** 0.7045*** 
  (0.1142) (0.1066) (0.0972) (0.1335) (0.1163) (0.1152) 
GDP growth  0.0204**    0.0087* 0.0129**    0.0055* 
  (0.0079)  (0.0045)  (0.0050)  (0.0029) 
Credit spread    -0.0261***  -0.0212***  -0.0166***  -0.0133*** 
   (0.0049)  (0.0051)  (0.0041)  (0.0040) 
R
2 0.4874 0.5458 0.5583 0.4318 0.4594 0.4654 
Observations  180 180 180 180 180 180 
* - Significant at the 10% level.
** - Significant at the 5% level.
*** - Significant at the 1% level.43
Table 9.  Lead-Lag Relation for the Private Equity Performance Index (PEPI) with the FoF and MSCI World Indices
Notes: This table examines the lead-lag relation between the performance for the PEPI in the United States and the returns for the FoF and MSCI 
World indices. The dependent variable is the quarterly return on PEPI for the United States, reported by Thomson Reuters and the National 
Venture Capital Association (NVCA) from Q1 of 1994 until Q3 of 2008. MSCI World is the return to the MSCI World index. The FoFs is the 
value-weight return on the index of listed funds of funds that invest in unlisted private equity funds. The standard errors are based on the Newey-
West estimator with 6 lags (in parentheses). 
Dependent Variable: Private Equity Performance Index (PEPI) Return 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Intercept 0.0153**  0.0149** 0.0137** 0.0122*  0.0093* 0.0088** 
  (0.0062) (0.0062) (0.0054) (0.0062) (0.0048) (0.0045) 
MSCI World  0.3863***  0.2677***  0.3355*** 0.3480*** 
  (0.0469)  (0.0444)  (0.0407) (0.0350) 
MSCI World (Lag)  0.0867*
(0.0526)
FoFs 0.2593*** 0.1268*** 0.2381*** 0.0596** 0.0476** 
(0.0244) (0.0270) (0.0235) (0.0249) (0.0217) 
FoFs (Lag)  0.0925**  0.1450*** 0.1071*** 
(0.0408) (0.0316) (0.0355) 
R
2 0.4879 0.4152 0.5414 0.4604 0.6439 0.6565 
Observations  59 59 59 58 58 58 
* - Significant at the 10% level.
** - Significant at the 5% level.
*** - Significant at the 1% level. 44
Figure 1. The Expected Abnormal Return and Market Value vs. Book Value of PE Investments 
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Figure2.UpperandLowerBoundsfortheExpectedAbnormalReturn
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Notes: This figure presents the upper and lower bounds for the expected abnormal return (D) for three different levels of the FoF 
discount: 5%, 12%, and 19%. These three levels reflect the point estimate and the end points of the 95% confidence interval for the 
average FoF discount twelve months after the initial public offering (see Table 3). The bounds for the expected abnormal return are 
determined by equations (9) and (10) in Section III.A.3 discussing the model. 46
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Figure3.SimulatedRelationfortheDiscountandtheExpectedAbnormalReturn
3.00%
2.00%
1.00%
0.00%
Ͳ1.00%
Ͳ2.00%
Ͳ3.00%
AbnormalReturn (D)
Discount =12%
Notes: This figure presents the simulated relation between the average (across funds) FoF discount and payout ratio for different levels of the 
expected abnormal return (D). The line labeled Discount = 12% plots the average discount observed in the sample one year after the initial public 
offerings for the funds of funds. We calculate the discount for each fund as unity minus the average simulated present value of all distributions to 
investors divided by the initial NAV of the fund. The expected abnormal return is the market’s expectation of the abnormal return for the 
underlying portfolio of PE investments. The simulation methodology is discussed in greater detail in the text.CFS Working Paper Series: 
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